Windfall Justice: Sentences at the Mercy of Hypertechnicality by Nordby, Jack
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 2
January 2004
Windfall Justice: Sentences at the Mercy of
Hypertechnicality
Jack Nordby
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Nordby, Jack (2004) "Windfall Justice: Sentences at the Mercy of Hypertechnicality," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 31: Iss. 2,
Article 2.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/2
NORDBY (CB & CKI & LSK).DOC 11/14/2004 3:58:24 PM 
 
407 
WINDFALL JUSTICE:  SENTENCES AT THE MERCY OF 
HYPERTECHNICALITY 
Jack Nordby† 
Once upon a time (a time not so remote as to be beyond the 
memories of many of us who still toil in the vineyards of justice), 
the severity of a criminal sentence was determined largely at the 
whim of the trial judge, who was guided only by vague 
considerations of suitability. Non-premeditated murder, for 
example, might be punished by anything from probation to forty 
years in prison.1  A parole board exercised a similarly subjective 
power to temper the term with early release.2  Then, about a 
quarter century ago, the legislature created a commission to 
establish sentencing “guidelines,” said to be “advisory,” to assist trial 
judges in devising sentences that would provide greater uniformity 
than had emerged under the earlier system.3  This resulted in 
classification of offenses according to severity which, cross-
referenced to the defendant’s criminal record, yielded a 
“presumptive” sentence.4  Now, in the case of the murderer 
mentioned above, instead of a range of zero to forty years, the 
scope would be 299–313 months.5  The range of the judge’s 
discretion, in other words, was abruptly pruned from forty years to 
fourteen months. 
Although described as “advisory,” the guidelines rather quickly 
became more nearly mandatory.  Any deviation from the 
prescribed sentence must be justified as a “departure” under an 
incredibly complex and evolving set of often vague rules found in 
 
       †   Judge, Hennepin County District Court; L.L.B., 1967, Harvard Law 
School; B.A., 1964, Harvard College.     
 1. MINN. STAT. § 609.19 (2002). 
 2. See MINN. STAT. § 243.12, repealed by 1983 Minn. Laws 274. 
 3. See MINN. STAT. § 244.09 (2002). 
 4. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
AND COMMENTARY 19-23 (revised Aug. 1, 2004), available at http://www.msgc.state. 
mn.us/Guidelines/guide04.DOC. 
 5. Id. at 49.  This assumes defendant has a clear prior record.  Id. 
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the guidelines themselves6 (as interpreted, refined, and confused 
by innumerable appellate opinions). 
Well-intended systems of governance (especially those 
designed to be flexible) have an apparently irresistible tendency to 
evolve into mechanisms of unforgiving rigidity.  The “advisory” 
guidelines became “presumptive.” The “presumptive” guidelines 
became all but mandatory.  The bases for departure matured from 
helpful suggestions to indispensable elements to be proved, 
pronounced, and entered on the record at a precisely appointed 
time. 
The apotheosis (or nadir) of this formulaic and ossifying 
pedantry was reached recently in State v. Geller.7  Mr. Geller 
committed a burglary and fled from police in a high-speed chase, 
throwing marijuana and guns from the car before crashing it.8  He 
pled guilty.9  The judge announced he was considering an upward 
departure and solicited memoranda on the matter.10  At 
sentencing, he imposed an upward departure, but neglected to 
state the reasons for it on the record.11  The court of appeals 
remanded to provide an opportunity to remedy this omission 
under Williams v. State,12 where the necessity of stating grounds to 
justify a departure had been emphasized.13 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in turn reversed, holding that 
there is no remedy for such an oversight.14  The opinion provides 
neither legal authority nor persuasive reasons why so draconian a 
result should flow from a judge’s momentary lapse, or why a simple 
remand is not the obvious way to correct it.  The opinion is a pure 
exercise of power, a flexing of minatory judicial muscle, so to 
speak, to “warn district courts.”15  The court takes no account of: 
(1) the unfairness to prosecutors of reducing sentences judges have 
 
 6. Id. at 24-31. 
 7. 665 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 2003). 
 8. Id. at 515. 
 9. Id. at 515-16. 
 10. Id. at 516. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985).  A number of court of appeals 
opinions had in similar circumstances simply and sensibly remanded.  See State v. 
McAdory, 543 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Garrett, 479 
N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Sundstrom, 474 N.W.2d 213, 216 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Pieri, 461 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 13. Williams, 361 N.W.2d at 843-44. 
 14. Geller, 665 N.W.2d at 517. 
 15. Id. 
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found justified; (2) more importantly perhaps, the unfairness to 
victims, whose violators may receive extraordinary windfalls in the 
form of early release; (3) the unfairness to the sentencing judge, 
whose moment of forgetfulness is elevated humiliatingly and 
unnecessarily to an irremediable defect;16 or (4) the damage to the 
integrity and perception of the justice system itself, whose 
aspirations toward carefully considered sentences tailored to the 
myriad interests of particular cases are thus defeated.  And—it 
bears repeating—no constitutional provision, no statute, no rule, 
no precedent required this outcome. 
Thus can the tail come to wag the dog.  
But any degree of certainty the Geller court might have thought 
it was injecting into sentencing must now be viewed in light of 
Blakely v. Washington.17  In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court 
effectively rendered Geller obsolete by holding that juries, not judges 
(no matter how punctually articulate about their reasons), must 
find the facts justifying departures.18  The opinion extended 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,19 which had required jury findings of any facts 
used to raise a sentence beyond the prescribed maximum, by 
holding that guideline sentences are such maximums.20  Thus, for those 
constitutional purposes, the maximum intentional murder 
sentence in Minnesota is not the forty-year outside figure of the 
statute, but the 299–313 months in the guidelines. 
It is surely ironic, and not altogether a bad thing, that just as 
the guideline system was reaching a point of atrophy in some 
respects, hyper-complexity in others, and petrifaction in at least the 
Geller example, it should in effect be disemboweled by a single bolt 
from on high.  For Blakely presages a revolution in sentencing; it is 
the epitaph to the guidelines system as we know it.  Decisions such 
as this from time to time provide salutarily humbling experiences 
for courts (or should do so).  Rarely has an opinion made nonsense 
 
 16. Within a few days of reading the Geller opinion and writing a commentary 
on it, I presided at a sentencing where I imposed a departure and forgot to state 
the reasons.  I have done the same thing two or three times since.  Although this 
may be attributable to shortcomings unique to myself, I doubt it. 
 17. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
 18. Id. at 2538-39. Unless the defendant waives the right to jury trial on the 
allegations supporting a departure, and either stipulates to them or submits them 
to the judge for decision, they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the 
jury.   The decision rests on the federal constitutional right to jury trial and thus is 
binding on the states. 
 19. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 20. Id. at 490. 
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(or at any rate greatly diminished sense) out of so many appellate 
opinions, trial court orders, statutes, commentaries, and other 
earnest and confident judicial pronouncements.  For it tells us we 
have failed for so long to understand an important aspect of so 
familiar, rudimentary, and essential a thing as the right to trial by 
jury. 
One hopes that in starting anew, as we must, we may rescue 
from the twenty-five year experiment what is valuable and 
constitutional, and eliminate what is not. 21 
 
 
 21. The options appear to be these: (1) Jury findings of departure factors, but 
this would result in a great deal of highly damaging evidence, otherwise 
inadmissible, coming into the trial; (2) Bifurcated trials, with the departure 
evidence heard by the jury at the second or sentencing phase; (3) Bifurcated trials 
with a jury waived for the sentencing phase, which would then be heard only the 
judge; (4) Stipulations by defendants to the departure factors, eliminating the 
need for evidence; (5) Legislation providing precise sentences for all crimes; or 
(6) A return to discretionary sentencing within broad limits.  It is likely the third 
and fourth options will, for practical reasons, be used in a majority of cases until a 
new system is devised. 
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